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Abstract 
Shipbuilding industry, having a great ripple effect on national economy, has been fostered by some 
countries as the national key industries. Korea also has supported shipbuilding industry as one of the 
industries politically fostered by the state. Accordingly, the shipbuilding industry of Korea has started 
to developed since 1970’s, reaching the world’s top position in 2000’s with reference to all the relevant 
indices. 
However, after the global financial crisis in 2008, the shipbuilding industries of Korea focused on 
offshore plants, resulting in huge deficit and being outranked by China. 
In this article, the past growing procedure of Korea’s shipbuilding industry was briefly reviewed, and 
the future plans for regaining the past glories as the shipbuilding power were sought. 
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1. Introduction 
The world’s shipbuilding industry was led by the UK in 1950’s and Japan in 1960’s. From 1970’s on, 
countries from the third group came to the fore. Particularly, Korea came up to the second rank in early 
1980’s. 
Although the marine transport and shipbuilding markets suffered a long-term depression in 1980’s due 
to the effect of two oil shocks in 1970’s, Korea’s share in the world shipbuilding market steadily 
increased to the point of being ranked at the world’s top with reference to the quantity of orders 
received in 1993, outranking Japan for the first time. In 2000’s, Korea’s shipbuilding industry was 
ranked at the top of the world with reference to all the indices including the quantity of orders received, 
quantity of ships built, and the quantity of orders at hand. In 2008, the total price of the ships exported 
from Korea reached 43.1 billion U.S dollars, being ranked at the top among the exported product items 
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of Korea.  
However, the world’s economy suffered heavily from the global financial crisis triggered by the 
subprime mortgage crisis of the U.S. in 2007. Being affected by the financial crisis, Korea’s marine 
transport and shipbuilding markets came to an economic recession. Due to the extreme “order drought”, 
many middle and small sized shipyards have been bankrupt or come under legal management, while 
large sized shipyards have recorded billion dollars of deficit, passing through the worst years in the 
forty years of Korean shipbuilding history. In particular, the shipbuilding industry has been supported 
by making up for the decrease in the orders of merchant ships with the orders of offshore plants or 
eco-ships. However, the motivation for the orders of offshore plants or eco-ships has been reduced due 
to the recent drop of oil price. On the other hand, Chinese shipyards are making good accomplishments 
and Japanese shipyards are supported by the low yen policy. Therefore, the troubles of Korean 
shipyards are growing fast. 
In such a situation, the past history of Korea’s shipbuilding industry which led the state’s economic 
growth is briefly reviewed, and the strategies needed to regain the lead in the world’s shipbuilding 
market are discussed. 
 
2. Development of Early Shipbuilding Industry Following Independence from Japanese Rule 
In early 20th century, after forcefully occupying the Korean Peninsula, the Japanese Empire 
constructed shipyards in Korea for the military purpose of invading China and Russia. However, the 
Japanese people exclusively occupied all the facilities, technologies, and materials for the shipyards in 
Korea, and there was not a well-equipped educational institution to teach shipbuilding technology. 
Modern shipyards constructed in Korea were just two, which were the Bangeojin Ironworks 
constructed in 1929 and the Joseon Heavy Industries constructed in 1937. 
Since the Independence from Japanese Rule in 1945, Korea’s shipbuilding industry started to grow by 
succeeding the Japanese-possessed shipyards, most of which were small ironwork companies fixing 
wooden vessels and small ships by using deteriorated facilities and instruments. 
During the Korean War, most of the industrial facilities were destructed, and most of the shipbuilding 
facilities in South Korea were severely damaged, except those in Busan region. However, during the 
war, the shipbuilding industry was activated not only by the demand for ships to transport war supplies 
and aid goods but also by the UN’s requests to fix ships and to build new ships. 
The Korean government promoted establishment of higher education institutes for the fostering of 
professional shipbuilding human resources. Department of Shipbuilding Engineering was established 
firstly at starting from Korea Maritime University in 1945, and then at Seoul National University in 
1946, at Busan Fishery University in 1950, and at Inha University in 1954, beginning to provide 
shipbuilding experts. In addition, considering the huge funds for the facility and operation required for 
a shipyard, which is difficult for a private company to bear, the government established a state-owned 
shipbuilding company. On the basis of the Joseon Heavy Industries constructed in 1937, the 
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government established the Korea Shipbuilding Corporation in 1950. 
In harmony with the government’s positive support, the number of shipbuilding companies was 
increased from 56 at the time of the Independence by about 3.5 times to be 198 of 1959. The quantity 
of shipbuilding was also increased from 19,000 tons of 1945 to 45,000 tons of 1961. 
The office devoted to shipbuilding industry, Section of Examination, Department of Administration, 
Bureau of Maritime Transport, was established in the Ministry of Transportation in 1948 to manage the 
shipbuilding industry. Many relevant organizations to form foundation of shipbuilding industry were 
also established around that time (Note 1). 
Act on Promotion of Shipbuilding Industry was legislated and proclaimed in March 1958 as a political 
supporting system prepared to resolve the problem of avoiding shipbuilding in the shipyards in Korea 
(Note 2). To increase shipbuilding in Korea, the government gave a subsidy within the limit of 40% of 
the shipbuilding cost and a loan of 50% or more (5% annual rate, pay back within 5-10 years) of 
shipbuilding cost, but the policy was unsuccessful due to the lack of budget (Note 3). 
Afterwards, the military regime which seized the power by a military coup in 1961 established 
economic development plans for industrialization and strongly promoted the plans. The shipbuilding 
industry was included in the plans. In the period of the 1st Economic Development Plan (1962-1966), a 
new Shipbuilding Promotion Plan was promoted, preparing various supporting plans to reduce the 
burden of shipbuilding cost. In addition, according to the Five-Year Shipbuilding Industry Plan, 990 
million KRW for the capital increase of Korea Shipbuilding Corporation and 78.6 million KRW of 
subsidy for promoting shipbuilding mutual-aid project were appropriated. However, the Plan was not 
successful due to the small scale of Korea’s maritime transport business which is the end user. The 
original plan was not implemented to achieve the goal as the priority of state industries moved to 
fertilizer, electricity, and cement industries. 
In 1964, a three-year plan was established for fostering of shipbuilding industry with regard to fishery 
development, ship quality improvement, and maritime transport ship introduction. 
By the Three-Year Plan for Fishery Development, 137 million dollars of loan was acquired to build 227 
ships including long liners, “Stantroll” factory ships, and fishery mother ships, and additional 52.64 
million dollars of loan was acquired to build 589 ships including large and middle sized steamers, 
trawlers, and whaling ships. Moreover, 52.64 million dollars of loan was used for motorizing of coastal 
fishery boats and dieselizing of low-performance fishery boats. 
According to the Three-Year Plan for Ship Quality Improvement, deteriorated and inefficient ship 
engines were replaced by diesel engines, and fixation of aged ships were promoted. The facility 
expansion and modernization plan of the Korea Shipbuilding Corporation enabled yearly shipbuilding 
of about 66,000 tons. 
According to the Three-Year Plan for Maritime Transport Ship Introduction, introduction of 175,000 
GT of ships was promoted in order to establish a system where domestic cargos could transported by 
domestic ships, as the demand for ocean-going transport was increased. 
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In March 1967, Act on Promotion of Shipbuilding Industry was legislated and proclaimed to prepare a 
legal basis to foster the shipbuilding industry in Korea (Note 4). 
The Five-Year Economic Development Plan promoted by the military government rapidly scale up 
Korea’s economy, and the demand for ships was quickly increased accordingly. However, the ratio of 
ships built in Korea was gradually decreased to 30% during the 1st Economic Development Plan and 
later to 13.5% during the 2nd Economic Development Plan. One of the main reasons for this result was 
that the quality and price of the ships built in Korea were not good, and another reason was the 
normalization of the diplomatic relation between Korea and Japan. As the diplomatic relation between 
the two countries became normalized, a considerable ratio of the economic cooperation fund provided 
as a loan was spent for buying ships for maritime transport and fishery. However, the free fund from 
Korea’s property claim against Japan could be spent only for building of coastal fishery ships of 20 
tons or less. Hence, ships were imported from other countries rather than built in Korea (Note 5). 
 
Table 1. Change of Financial Conditions of Shipbuilding Subsidy by Act on Promotion of 
Shipbuilding Industry (1967) 
Loan Condition Before Amendment After Amendment 
Direct Subsidy 30% abolished 
Ratio of Loan 55% 85% 
Period of Refund 20 years 15 years 
Interest Rate 6% annual rate 7.5% annual rate 
Source: Korea Offshore & Shipbuilding Association, Korea’s Shipbuilding Industry: Growth and Tasks 
(2005, p. 170). 
 
The policies for shipbuilding industry fostering promoted by the government in 1960’s were focused on 
the increase of the small ship building based on domestic demand, and thus they were insufficient to 
modernize the facilities and strengthen the international competitiveness. In addition, since the early 
economic development policy was concentrated on light industries, the shipbuilding industry, which is 
one of heavy industries, did not get special benefit from the policies. 
Eventually, it was in 1970’s that the foundation for the development of Korea’s shipbuilding industry 
was prepared. Scaling up of ships was undergoing worldwide at that time due to the closing of the Suez 
Canal. Also, expansion of shipyards was required in Korea to increase the self-sufficiency of ships from 
the end of 1960’s. Hence, the government changed the direction of the policies to positive support of 
shipyard construction. 
In September 1970, Hyundai Engineering & Construction Co., Ltd submitted the business plan to 
construct a giant shipyard by using the equipment and human resources which had been put to the 
construction works in Middle East. The initial plan was to build a 100,000-ton shipbuilding dock, but 
the plan was modified to build a 500,000-ton dock in harmony with the scaling-up trend of the world’s 
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shipbuilding market. The shipyard construction commencement took place at the Mipo Bay, Ulsan, in 
March, 1972. However, the construction was further scaled-up to prepare a dock where a 1,000,000-ton 
oil tanker might be built, according to the “Long-term Plan for Shipbuilding Industry”. Eventually, with 
the expansion work in parallel, the world’s largest shipyard having a 900 m dock and a 560 m dock was 
completed. 
Following the completion of the Hyundai Ulsan Shipyard, Hyundai Mipo Dockyard was completed in 
1975. The giant shipyard started to be constructed at Okpo, Geoje, by the Korea Shipbuilding 
Corporation in 1973 was handed over to Daewoo Group to be Daewoo Heavy Industries & Machinery. 
Samsung Group Also established Samsung Shipbuilding Co., Ltd by merging Woojin Shipbuilding 
which had been constructing a shipyard at Geoje, Gyeongsangnam-do, to complete Dock No. 1 in 
1979. 
Table 2 shows the status of giant shipyards constructed in Korea in 1970’s. 
The key polices promoted by Korean government in relation to shipbuilding industry in 1970’s include 
the Shipbuilding Industry Promotion Plan, established in February 1970, for the increase of domestic 
ship self-sufficiency, the elevation of domestic production rate, and the promotion of ship export. 
The government provided a total of 2,070 million KRW including the financial fund of 1,190 million 
KRW and the mechanical industry fostering fund of 880 million KRW to implement the plan. 
Additionally, 30 million KRW was put into the modernization of the facilities from the fund prepared 
by selling industrial financial bonds. 
In March 1973, the Long-term Plan for Shipbuilding Industry Promotion was established, which was to 
foster Korea’s shipbuilding industry by taking the advantage of the situation of that time in which the 
shipbuilding industries of Western countries and Japan were going down due to the high wage and 
deteriorated facilities. The outline of the plan is to integrate and systematize minor shipyards into 
specialized middle size shipyards on the basis of two world’s best giant shipyards including the 
Hyundai’s shipyard in order to greatly increase the shipbuilding capacity. 
However, the Long-term Plan for Shipbuilding Industry Promotion had no choice but to be modified 
from the early stage due to the global economic recession caused by the oil crisis in 1973 as well as the 
depression of the world’s shipbuilding industry. Therefore, the government implemented the “Planned 
Shipbuilding System” to foster the shipbuilding industry in connection with the domestic maritime 
transport industry. 
 
Table 2. Status of Construction of Giant Shipyards in 1970’s 
Company Construction Status 
Hyundai Heavy Industries 
Co., Ltd. 
· Construction began in March, 1972 
· Completed in December, 1973 
· VLCC of 260,000 tons built in June, 1974 
Hyundai Mipo Dockyard 
Co., Ltd. 
· Factory No. 1 construction began in March, 1975 
· Hyundai Mipo Dockyard Co., Ltd established in April, 1975 
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· Shipbuilding started July, 1975 
Daewoo Heavy Industries & 
Machinery Co., Ltd. 
· Dock No. 1 construction began in Okpo by Korea Shipbuilding 
Corporation in August, 1973 
· Construction delayed by the 1st Oil Crisis in October, 1973 
· Dock No. 1 completed in August, 1978 
· Daewoo Group merged Okpo Shipyard in December, 1978 
· Additional facilities construction completed in 1981 
Samsung Heavy Industries 
Co., Ltd. 
· Korea Shipbuilding Co., Ltd established in March, 1974 
· Shipyard construction began in December, 1974 
· Merged to Woojin Shipbuilding Co., Ltd. in March, 1977 
· Merged to Samsung in April, 1977 
· Shipyard began operation in September, 1979 
· Dock No. 1 construction completed in December, 1979 
Source: Korea Offshore & Shipbuilding Association, Korea’s Shipbuilding Industry: Growth and Tasks 
(2005, p. 37). 
 
The ultimate goal of the system was, “Our cargos are transported by our ships, which are built in our 
shipyards”. In this system, national flag shipping companies recognized by the government as an ender 
user of shipbuilding fund were given the government’s financial support to build the ships in the 
shipyards located in Korea. 
The system was specifically implemented by the Comprehensive Plan for Ocean-Going Maritime 
Transport Fostering prepared in April 1974 and the Comprehensive Plan for Fostering Maritime 
Transport and Shipbuilding prepared in March 1976. The system obtained the legal basis by the 
Maritime Transport Promotion Act amended in December 1978. 
According to the planned shipbuilding, all home-waters liners and 75% of ocean-going ships could be 
built by the funds for planned shipbuilding, and a loan of 80% of the ship price (appraised value 
entrusted to Korea Appraisal Board by Korea Development Bank) was provided. The planned 
shipbuilding greatly helped the industry in the sense that the minimum shipbuilding quantity could be 
maintained even during the depression of the shipbuilding industry (Note 6).  
Like this, in early 1970’s, the competitive scale for the world’s shipbuilding market was prepared by 
the construction of the shipyards of Hyundai, Samsung, and Daewoo, and the government made a huge 
contribution to the shipbuilding industry by providing financial support for facility expansion and 
implementing the planned shipbuilding project. Thanks to these efforts, different from the European 
and American shipbuilding companies which were reducing the facilities or being bankrupt due to the 
global depression of the shipbuilding industry, Korea expanded the shipbuilding facilities and rapidly 
grew to be one of the largest shipbuilding countries within just 10 years from the state of 1960’s having 
almost no foundation for the industry. 
 
3. Revival of Korea’s Shipbuilding Industry 
The depression of the global maritime transport market following the two times of oil crisis in 1970’s 
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cause a considerable trouble to the shipbuilding industry. The government of Korea decided to make 
shipbuilding an export industry in harmony with the domestic and international conditions during the 
4th Five-Year Economic Development Plan. The policies put emphasis on making shipbuilding an 
export industry through the supply increase based on deferred payment export, improving 
self-sufficiency of shipbuilding technology, positively implementing planned shipbuilding, 
interconnecting and fostering of maritime transport business and shipbuilding industry, and increasing 
domestic production of the equipment and materials. 
In response to the shipbuilding industry fostering policies of the government, Dock No. 2 of Daewoo 
Shipbuilding was completed in January 1983 and Dock No. 2 of Samsung Heavy Industries was 
completed in March 1983, concluding the long-term project of shipyard construction. As of end of 
1983, the number of shipbuilding companies in Korea was increased to have four large companies, 7 
middle sized companies, and 223 small sized companies (Note 7). The rank of Korea’s shipbuilding 
industry jump to the second of the world from early 1980’s. 
However, the global economy kept a low growth rate of 2.4% from 1980 to 1987 due to the shock of 
the oil crisis. Accordingly, the world’s trade was significantly decreased, and the maritime transport 
traffic was decreased even more by the trend that the key industries of the advanced countries were 
shifted from heavy industries to high-tech industries such as semiconductor industry. Therefore, the 
depression of the maritime transport and shipbuilding industries continued for a long time. Particularly, 
shipping owners often delayed ship take-over intentionally for the reason of the depression of the 
maritime transport market, resulting in closing of shipbuilding companies due to financial problems. 
In such a global economic situation, the shipbuilding companies of Japan, which were leading the 
world’s shipbuilding market, were greatly damaged. In particular, the competitiveness of the Japanese 
companies was drastically decreased as the exchange rate was suddenly increased by the Plaza Accord. 
As many shipbuilding companies were bankrupt and close, the Japanese government reduced the 
shipbuilding capacity through a rationalization measure. Some shipping companies of Korea were also 
bankrupt due to the deterioration of the financial status, and some ships were detained in other 
countries. 
To support the shipbuilding industries in severe difficulties, the Korean government prepared a special 
supporting plan called “Plan for Rationalization of Maritime Transport Industry (Draft)” in December 
1983, deliberated the plan in the Industrial Policy Council in May 1984, and passed the plan in July 
1985. The Rationalization Plan included the reduction and exemption of the registration tax, acquisition 
tax, and special value-added tax according to the Tax Reduction and Exemption Act for the shipping 
companies designated as the rationalization targets, and financial support in KRW and foreign currency. 
Accordingly, among 66 national flag shipping companies, 63 companies participated in the shipping 
company reorganization work, except 3 companies which were joint ventures with foreign capital. As a 
result, the conventional 63 ocean-going maritime transport companies were rearranged into 20 group 
shipping companies at the end of December, 1985. 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/jepf             Journal of Economics and Public Finance                 Vol. 3, No. 2, 2017 
158 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
In 1986, to strengthen the global competitiveness of the shipbuilding industry, the deferred export 
financing conditions for the ships supported by the Export-Import Bank of Korea were changed to the 
OECD credit understanding standards. In addition, 110 items of ship equipment and materials were 
systematized for the fostering of the equipment and materials production industries. As a part of local 
machinery manufacturing policy, 58 items of shipbuilding equipment and materials were determined as 
the local manufacturing and development targets in 1986, and the large shipyards were encouraged to 
purchase the developed equipment and materials to enhance local manufacturing.  
Fortunately, the global shipbuilding market started to be recovering from the bottom in 1985. Thanks to 
the “three-low” (exchange rate, oil price, and raw material price), the quantity of orders was increased, 
and the recovering phase started from 1986. In 1987, most of the world’s shipbuilding orders were 
concentrated on Korea, and thus the world market share was increased up to 30.2%. However, a large 
scale labor dispute took place in the domestic political and social confusions following the 
pro-democracy movement and the 29 June Declaration in 1987. From late 1987, the shipbuilding 
industry suffered hardships including delayed arrival date, and wage increase due to the severe labor 
dispute, as well as appreciation of Korean Won due to the disappearance of “three-low” effects. The 
financial status of Korea’s shipbuilding industry became worse in 1988. Due to the “three-high” (high 
exchange rate, high oil price, and high interest rate), Korean Won was highly appreciated (15.2%). The 
ability to pay was greatly decreased since the orders were made with reference to the ship price on the 
basis of the depreciated Korean Won, causing confusions in the management. The wage was greatly 
increased due to the labor dispute, and the price of equipment and materials including the steel 
materials was also increased, resulting in an overall elevation of shipbuilding cost in almost all sections. 
Therefore, the shipbuilding companies confronted the risk of bankruptcy with the concerns for the 
impact to the national economy and society which might be caused by chain-reaction bankruptcy of 
relevant middle and small sized equipment and material companies, large-scale unemployment, and 
shock to the local economy in the regions of shipyards. Thus, in August 1989, the Korean government 
published the national “Shipbuilding Industry Rationalization Measure” to improve financial structure 
of the shipbuilding companies and rationalize the management. The Measure encouraged the 
rationalization target companies to take self-efforts for financial status improvement by selling 
subsidiaries and assets, or by integrating the subsidiaries or to promote normalization of the 
management by being merged into a third party. In such cases, the target companies were supposed to 
be given a number of special preferences such as tax support, exemption of registration and acquisition 
tax in the case of a merger and acquisition, exemption of withholding tax for the preserved asset in the 
case of acquisition by a third party, and admission of exception for exceeding the investment limit for 
the subsidiaries. In addition, new construction or expansion of shipbuilding facilities was restricted to 
the end of 1993. The Ship Export Recommendation System, which was prepared for the government to 
allocate export, was implemented to prevent excessive competition including receiving low-price 
overseas orders. 
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Table 3. Comparison of Shipbuilding Market Shares by Individual Countries (with Reference to 
Quantity of Shipbuilding) (Unit: %, 10,000 GT) 
 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003 
Korea n.a n.a 1.2 4.0 14.4 21.8 27.8 39.1 38.3 
Japan 41.5 48.1 49.7 46.5 52.3 43.0 41.6 38.4 35.3 
China n.a n.a n.a n.a 0.9 2.3 4.3 4.8 10.5 
Western Europe 49.2 40.4 38.2 22.6 16.3 17.9 19.3 13.2 10.6 
World Total 1,176 2,098 3,420 1,310 1,816 1,589 2,239 3,124 3,550 
Source: Lioyd’s Statistical Data for Each Year (including ships larger than 100 GT). 
 
In these difficult times, the Korea Shipbuilding Corporation, the long time representative of Korea’s 
shipbuilding history, was merged in 1990 to become Hanjin Heavy Industries & Construction. With 
respect to Daewoo Shipbuilding, while many argued to sell the company due to the excessive 
shipbuilding facilities in comparison with the maritime transport demand, the government decided to 
support the company for fear of unemployment problem which might be caused by mass discharge of 
workers. Incheon Shipbuilding was acquired by Halla Group to have a new name of Halla Heavy 
Industries. 
The “Shipbuilding Industry Rationalization Measure” eliminated the risk of chain-reaction bankruptcy 
of relevant companies including the subsidiaries and shipbuilding equipment and material companies as 
well as the risk of mass discharge of workers. Internationally, the Measure enabled for Korea’s 
shipbuilding industry to maintain foreign credit rating by preventing contract failure which could 
happen due to the bankruptcy of the relevant companies. Therefore, the Measure is considered as an 
appropriate action at an appropriate time. However, there is a critical point of view toward the Measure 
that the government inhibited the industry from acquiring self-reliance by the direct intervention, not 
letting the companies overcome the difficulties of the economic depression through restructuring by 
themselves (Note 8).  
From 1989, the global shipbuilding market came out of the depression phase and enter into a thriving 
phase. Shipbuilding orders started to be increased by optimistic ship owners. The market share of 
Korean companies was gradually increased, even being ranked at the top with reference to the quantity 
of orders received in 1993, outranking Japan due to the strengthening of Japanese Yen. As the 
“Shipbuilding Industry Rationalization Measure” was discontinued, the Ship Export Recommendation 
System was abolished on July 1, 1993, and the temporary restriction of new construction or expansion 
of shipbuilding facilities was also discontinued. Taking this opportunity, Samsung Heavy Industries 
extended the length of Dock No. 2 in December 1993 for the building of giant oil tankers, and 
completed the construction of Dock No. 3 in October 1994, having the complete system for building 
giant oil tankers. Hyundai Heavy Industries also completed the construction of Docks No. 8 and No. 9 
in August and November, 1995 (Note 9).  
However, Japanese shipbuilding industry, which was behind Korea in the price competitiveness due to 
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the strong Yen, quickly recovered the competitiveness from late 1995 on the basis of the continuous 
depreciation of Japanese Yen, increased importing of materials from other countries, and the efforts for 
rationalization. On the contrary, Korea’s shipbuilding industry had difficulties in receiving orders in 
1996, as the competitiveness was lost due to the cost increase by the rise of labor cost and the 
equipment and material price. In particular, as Japan increased the capacity to supply by relieving the 
equipment regulations, the global competition was intensified, resulting in a difficult situation once 
again due to the decrease of the price for new ships and the deterioration of the financial balance. 
Moreover, due to the continued bankruptcy of companies under the IMF administration after the 
currency crisis in 1997, credit crunch of companies became worse and the financing became more 
difficult, causing the sense of crisis, which led to intensified reconstructing of shipbuilding companies. 
Halla Heavy Industries, having a debt ratio of 1,000% or higher, came under a bankrupt state. Samsung 
Heavy Industries, which had been making financial loss in two consecutive years due to huge plant and 
equipment investment, was able to escape from the financial loss in early 1998 through the 
restructuring of selling the heavy building equipment part and the transport and cargo handling part to 
Volvo, Sweden, and Clark, U.S., respectively. 
 
Table 4. Variation of Korea, Japan, and China in Global Shipbuilding Market Status (with 
Reference to Orders Received, 10,000 GT) 
 1995 2000 2003 2005 
World market 2,553 4,514 7,404 6,133 
Quantity of orders received  
(10,000 GT) 
Korea 776 (30.4%) 2,069 (45.8%) 3,240 (43.8%) 2,161 (35.2%) 
Japan 891 (34.9%) 1,287 (28.5%) 2,363 (31.9%) 1,650 (26.9%) 
China 111 (4.3%) 253 (5.6%) 1,065 (14.4%) 1,062 (17.3%) 
Source: Lioyd’s Statistical Data for Each Year.  
Note. World market share in parenthesis. 
 
However, the currency crisis provided an opportunity to strengthen price competitiveness of Korea’s 
shipbuilding industry at a single sweep. A drastic appreciation of Korean Won increased the price 
competitiveness of the shipbuilding industry, and greatly improved the financial environment by the 
foreign-exchange profit since the advances and the payment for the ordered ships were received in 
dollars. Therefore, except the bankrupt companies such as Halla Heavy Industries or Daedong 
Shipbuilding or Daewoo Heavy Industries & Machinery following the composition procedure, the 
currency crisis provided an opportunity for the entire shipbuilding companies in Korea. In addition, 
Japanese shipbuilding companies which had already secured work projects for the year of 2000 were 
not actively receiving shipbuilding orders for the fear of decrease of ship price. Korea’s shipbuilding 
industry was able to overcome the IMF relief loan crisis and recover the competitiveness in the global 
market in a relatively short period of time for the reasons that Korea and Japan were the only two 
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countries capable of constructing competitive merchant ships at that time and that Korea’s shipbuilding 
companies had accumulated trust with foreign ship owners. Korea returned the top rank in 1999 with 
reference to the orders received for the second time after 1993, and then kept the top rank in 2000, 
recording top rank in the two consecutive years with 45% of share in the global shipbuilding orders. 
As described above, Korea’s shipbuilding industry had fluctuation in 1990’s. However, there was 
neither a governmental policy implemented for the fostering or supporting of the shipbuilding industry 
nor a large-scale research and development project carried out solely by the shipbuilding industry. 
There were only few research and development projects included in industrial infrastructure projects. 
This is related to the conversion of the government’s industrial restructuring policy to market principle. 
Before mid 1980’s, the government supported individual industries, and the shipbuilding industry 
received various political benefits as a concentrated fostering subject. However, in mid 1980’s, the 
system to support individual industries was abolished, and the direction of governmental policies was 
changed to respect the autonomy of the industry. In addition, the shipbuilding industry was considered 
as a matured industry in Korea in 1990’s, meaning that the companies were able to conduct research 
and development with their own capability. In addition, shipbuilding industry requires less fundamental 
research projects in comparison with other industries. 
From 2000, Korea’s shipbuilding industry, having well overcome the IMF administration in late 1990’s, 
took the lead in the world’s shipbuilding market with references to all the indices including quantity of 
orders received, quantity of ships built, and the quantity of orders at hand. As of 2003, Korea’s 
shipbuilding companies had the quantity of orders received of 32,400,000 GT, sharing 43.8% of the 
global market and thus returning to the top rank for the fourth time after 1993, 1999, and 2000. The 
global market share with reference to the quantity of ships built was 38.8%, followed by 35.3% of 
Japan and 10.5% of China. Korea returned to the top rank with reference to the quantity of ships built 
for the third time after 2000 and 2002. Korea’s global market share with reference to quantity of orders 
at hand was 39.9%, taking the lead in six consecutive years from 1998. These data mean that Korea’s 
shipbuilding industry has a firm position as the world’s leader. 
On the other hand, Japan, which had led the world shipbuilding industry for more than 40 years from 
1960’s, was outranked by Korea from the top position around the year of 2000, since Japanese 
shipbuilding companies passively responded to the changes of the global demand. Japan has started to 
be led even by China since 2006. 
 
4. Global Financial Crisis and Risk of Korea’s Shipbuilding Industry 
A direct factor to the prosperity of shipbuilding industry from 2003 to 2007 was the increase of 
transport traffic due to the increase of raw material demand of emerging countries including China and 
the increase in trade between advanced countries and emerging countries. In response to the prosperity 
of shipbuilding countries, Korea’s shipyards swept No. 1 to 7 ranks of the global market with 
references to the quantity of orders at hand in 2006. The quantity of export by shipbuilding industry in 
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2008 was 43,100,000,000 dollars, which was more than 10% of the entire export quantity of Korea, 
taking the lead for the first time by outranking the automobile and semiconductor industries. 
However, as New Century Financial, which was the second largest housing fund loan company in the 
U.S., filed for bankruptcy in April 2007, global financial crisis spread to not only in the U.S. but also in 
other countries, resulting in an impact on shipbuilding industry which is sensitive to economic 
fluctuation. The shipbuilding market was speedily decreased as the ship price was unusually lowered 
due to the decrease of raw material demand, reduction of maritime transport of crude oil, cancellation 
of shipbuilding orders, decrease of new shipbuilding orders, and reduction of maritime transport 
quantity. Accordingly, with reference to Lloyd statistics, the global quantity of orders received was 
decreased from 87,290,000 CGT of 2007 to 41,390,000 CGT of 2008, and 16,580,000 CGT of 2009 by 
more than 80% within just two years. Korea’s quantity of new shipbuilding orders received was also 
strikingly decreased, and thus Korea was outranked by China with reference to the quantity of orders 
received and the quantity of orders at hand in 2009 and with reference to the quantity of ships built in 
2010 (Table 5). 
In 2010, shipbuilding industry came out of the worst situation as the global quantity of orders received 
was increased more than two times in comparison to that of the previous year. In 2011, while the global 
quantity of orders received was again deceased by more than 20% in comparison to that of the previous 
year, Korea’s shipbuilding companies temporarily returned to the world’s top rank by focusing on the 
orders (more than 40% of order quantity of the world) of high value-added ships such as LNG ships, 
large container ships, and drill ships. On the other hand, China’s quantity of orders received was 
decreased by about 50% relative to that of the previous year due to the depression of the bulk carriers, 
which were the major products of Chinese shipbuilding companies. However, Korea’s shipbuilding 
industry was once again outranked by China after 2012 with reference to all the indices including 
quantity of orders received, quantity of ships built, and the quantity of orders at hand. As the orders 
were concentrated on high value-added ships produced by large shipbuilding companies, middle and 
small sized shipbuilding companies suffered severe difficulties. 
From 2009 to 2012, most of Korea’s shipbuilding companies showed an increase of the profit, coming 
out of the depression just after the financial crisis. However, after showing a decreasing trend from 
2012, the companies, especially the large shipbuilding companies, showed shocking results. 
The STX Offshore & Shipbuilding Co., Ltd., once called one of the Big 4 in shipbuilding industry, was 
dissolved due to a liquidity crisis in 2013. Hyundai Heavy Industries, the world’s top shipbuilding 
company, recorded 3,249.5 billion KRW of business loss in 2014 for the first time since its 
establishment. Samsung Heavy Industries recorded 362.5 billion KRW of business loss in the first 
quarter of 2014 and then manage to turn into a profit in the second quarter. 
The direct cause of the unprecedented large loss by the Korea’s large shipbuilding companies was the 
bad financial state originated from the offshore plant business. 
Offshore plant is the tye symbol of the matchless competitiveness of Korea’s shipbuilding industry. The 
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offshore plant market was a very big market sharing about 51% of the entire shipbuilding industry in 
2012. Korea’s Big 3 shipbuilding companies almost monopolized the world market, leaving Japanese 
and Chinese companies behind.  
Due to the decrease in the maritime transport traffic during global economic recession following the 
financial crisis in 2008, the assets of Korean shipping companies were gradually decreasing as the 
orders of merchant ships including container carriers and bulk carriers were significantly decreasing. At 
that time, due to the high oil price, global oil managers ordered a considerable quantity of offshore 
plant construction for the deep sea resource development from 2010. The Big 3, which just received 
orders of coastal plants, actively participated in the offshore plant business, competitively receiving 
orders of offshore plant projects in a turn key base system (contract for design and construction 
combined). 
 
Table 5. Shipbuilding Market Indices of Korea, China and Japan: 2007-2013 
Index 
Year Korea China Japan Global 
1,000 CGT % 1,000 CGT % 1,000 CGT % 1,000 CGT % 
Quantity 
of Orders 
Received 
2007 32,861 37.6 31,382 36.0 10,017 11.5 87,288 100 
2008 15,833 38.3 13,148 31.8 6,525 15.8 41,386 100 
2009 3,443 20.8 6,987 42.1 3,895 23.5 16,580 100 
2010 11,172 28.9 16,083 41.6 5,373 13.9 38,625 100 
2011 13,550 43.9 8,224 26.7 4,073 13.2 30,846 100 
2012 6,823 27.9 8,110 33.2 4,318 17.7 24,421 100 
2013 15,553 30.8 17,671 35.0 6,941 13.8 50,453 100 
2014 12,076 32.0 13,280 35.2 8,819 23.4 37,747 100 
Quantity 
of ships 
built 
2007 11,277 32.5 6,795 19.6 8,913 25.7 34,670 100 
2008 14,509 35.4 9,065 22.1 9,759 23.8 41,019 100 
2009 14,466 33.1 12,387 28.4 9,608 22.0 43,692 100 
2010 14,906 28.8 18,800 36.3 9,820 19.0 51,664 100 
2011 15,797 30.9 19,198 37.6 9,160 17.9 51,044 100 
2012 13,391 27.9 19,331 40.3 8,350 17.4 47,918 100 
2013 11,395 29.7 11,784 30.7 6,828 17.8 38,349 100 
2014 10,120 33.5 10,193 33.7 6,585 21.8 30,218 100 
Quantity 
of orders 
at hand 
2007 64,575 35.6 53,101 29.3 31,355 17.3 181,449 100 
2008 64,357 33.8 62,001 32.6 30,649 16.1 190,266 100 
2009 47,576 31.3 54,357 35.8 24,460 16.0 151,952 100 
2010 39,145 30.5 48,922 38.2 19,835 15.4 128,013 100 
2011 33,066 29.7 38,872 34.9 15,829 14.2 111,442 100 
2012 24,164 27.3 29,361 33.1 12,223 13.8 88,674 100 
2013 27,883 27.9 33,427 33.5 13,337 13.4 99,767 100 
2014 29,081 30.8 36,417 38.5 17,046 18.0 94,555 100 
Source: Lloyd’s World Shipping Statistics, Each year. 
Note. Quantity of orders at hand as of the end of each year. 
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The quantity of offshore plant orders received by Korea’s shipbuilding companies was highly increased 
from 5,242 million dollars of 2009 to 8.86 million dollars of 2010, 17,500 million dollars of 2011, and 
21,785 million dollars of 2012, almost monopolizing the orders. In 2012 and 2012, which was the 
climax of the offshore plant orders, the ratio of offshore plants in the entire quantity of orders received 
by Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering and Samsung Heavy Industries was almost 90%. 
However, the side effects of the offshore plant project orders received by the large shipbuilding 
companies came to the fore as the plants started to be handed over. The Big 3 of Korea’s shipbuilding 
industry recorded the worst loss ever. The most fundamental reason for the result was that the project 
cost needed for the structurally complicated plant was not accurately calculated due to the lack of 
experience and that the companies competitively received orders without the basic design ability and 
the capability to produce core equipment and materials. 
Eventually, some construction projects were delayed, the design was often modified, and the 
construction process was not well maintained, resulting in snowballing of the building cost. Moreover, 
the quantity of offshore plant orders received was drastically decreased due to the sudden fall of oil 
price in late 2014, and the utilization of drilling equipment was also decreased. Therefore, offshore 
plant ordering bodies tried to delay the hand-over as much as possible or cancelled the contract, and the 
shipbuilding companies were unable to fulfill the hand-over date, resulting of cancellation of contracts. 
In this way, the risk of the Big 3 became worse and worse. In 2015, Samsung Heavy Industries 
recorded 1,501.9 billion KRW of business loss, Hyundai Heavy Industries 1,540.1 billion KRW, and 
Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering 5,505.1 billion KRW, summing up to be 10,000 billion 
KRW of loss within just two years of 2014 and 2015 (Note 10). Offshore plant, which had been 
regarded as timely rain in times of drought or a money spinner for Korea’s shipbuilding industry, fell so 
low as to become a massive white elephant bringing about astronomical loss. The after effect is 
expected to continue in 2016, because there are so many unexpected factors such as low price orders 
received, contract cancelled, and hand-over delayed. 
Worse than the Big 3, the fate of Korea’s middle and small sized shipbuilding companies hangs by a 
thread, because their major products are in competition with Chinese companies. STX Offshore & 
Shipbuilding, Sungdong Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering, SPP Shipbuilding, and Daesun 
Shipbuilding & Engineering started voluntary negotiation (Note 11) with the creditors, but they are like 
candle in the wind. Daehan Shipbuilding, Shina SB, Jinse Shipbuilding, and Orient Shipyard are under 
legal management to be sold. Sekwang Shipbuilding, C&Shipbuilding, Nokbong Shipbuilding, Samho 
Shipbuilding, 21th Century Shipbuilding, and Seko Shipbuilding were already sold or closed. 
According to the industrial news, about 10,000 billion KRW was already invested to the four 
shipbuilding companies undergoing the voluntary negotiation. 
In such a situation, China and Japan are challenging the high value-added shipbuilding market which 
was almost monopolized by Korea’s shipbuilding companies. Since 2015, Chinese and Japanese 
shipbuilding companies started to received orders for large container carriers, extending to large oil 
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tankers and LNG carriers. 
 
5. Future Task of Korea’s Shipbuilding Industry and Concluding Remarks 
Korea developed the shipbuilding industry by acquiring the shipyards possessed by Japanese people 
after the Independence from Japanese Imperialism, but the industrial foundation was very weak in 
1960’s. 
As the industrialization focused on heavy and chemical industries was promoted by the military power 
of President Park Chung-hee in 1970’s, large enterprises such as Hyundai Heavy Industries, Daewoo, 
and Samsung positively participated in the shipbuilding industry, coming out of the small domestic 
market and entering to the global market. The government encouraged to increase the self-sufficiency 
of ships and local production of equipment and materials through the Shipbuilding Promotion Plan, the 
Long-term Plan for Shipbuilding Industry Promotion, and the planned shipbuilding system, inducing 
stable manufacturing at shipyards. 
In early 1980’s, the financial status of Korea’ shipbuilding companies became deteriorated due to the 
long-term depression in the global maritime transport and shipbuilding market caused by the 
after-effect of oil crisis in 1970’s. However, starting from late 1986, as the global shipbuilding market 
was recovered, the quantity of orders received was increased, and most of the orders came to Korea. As 
a result, Korea recorded over 30% of global market share to begin rapid development. 
In 1990’s, Korea’s shipbuilding industry experienced severe fluctuation. As the Plan for Rationalization 
of Maritime Transport Industry ended in 1992, the middle and large sized shipbuilding companies 
including Samsung Heavy Industries, Hyundai Heavy Industries, Halla Heavy Industries, and Daedong 
Shipbuilding started to expand the shipbuilding facilities. The profitability was improved in almost all 
the shipyards, and the competitiveness was recovered, recording business gain. Eventually, at the time 
when the shipyards in advanced countries were closed due to the economic depression, Korea’s 
shipbuilding companies rather expanded the facilities and scaled-up to increase their share in the global 
shipbuilding market to prepare a stepping stone for further growth in the prosperous phase. The 
technological level was elevated in a short period of time. The orders for high value-added ships 
including LNG ships, large container carriers, and Floating Production, Storage, and Off-Loading 
systems (FPSO) were significantly increased in 1990’s. Although the country as well as the 
shipbuilding industry faced a serious crisis in 1997 due to the currency crisis, the shipbuilding 
companies took the opportunity to restructuring the companies and improve the efficiency, early 
escaping from the currency crisis. 
Korea’s shipbuilding industry, which had managed to export a deep-sea fishing vessel of 2500 T in 
1969, took the lead in global market for 9 consecutive years from 1999 to 2007 with reference to the 
quantity of orders at hand. Korean shipbuilding companies ranked from 1 to 7 in 2006 with reference to 
the quantity of orders received. In 2008, the shipbuilding industry had the largest share in the export 
from Korea. Korea’s shipbuilding industry truly outranked Japan to be at the top of the world in all 
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aspects from the year 2000. 
Such a brilliant growth of Korea’s shipbuilding industry was possible thanks to the positive investment 
strategies of companies and the government’s timely policies. In particular, abundant provision of 
low-paid workers, low-price provision of various shipbuilding equipment and materials, and 
development of mechanical, steel, and electronic industries helped Korea’s shipbuilding industry 
maintain a dominant position in price competitiveness. 
Above all, the rapid growth of the shipbuilding industry was due to the growth strategy focused on 
chaebols, the giant business tycoons. The government had no choice but to work with chaebol 
enterprises, because there were no other companies having enough capital and human resources to start 
a shipbuilding business than chaebol enterprises. When shipbuilding companies recorded a great loss in 
the early stage, chaebol companies were able to overcome the crisis with the help from the subsidiaries 
or by the cooperation with relevant subsidiaries in similar business. The competition between the 
chaebol companies also enabled bold expansion of shipbuilding facilities and development of high 
technologies through research and development, contributing a lot to the growth of Korea’s 
shipbuilding industry. As a result of the successful strategy, the Big 3 of Korean shipbuilding industry 
ranked at No. 1 to 3 positions. The world’s top shipbuilding company, Hyundai Heavy Industries, set 
the new world records one after another in the number of ship hand over (1,000 ships in March 2002 
and 2,000 ships in May 2015). 
However, after the global financial crisis in 2008, Korea’s shipbuilding industry faced a serious crisis, 
losing all the fame and riches accumulated in the world market previously. The quantity of orders 
received was remarkably decreased due to the reduced transport traffic caused by the economic 
recession of global economic powers including China and European countries. Meanwhile, Korea’s 
shipbuilding industry had to give the leading position to China. Offshore plant which came to the fore 
in the difficult times drew attention as future growth engine for Korea’s shipbuilding industry, and 
Korea’s Big 3 joined in the competition, almost sweeping global orders. However, the project backfired 
on since the business was started without sufficient building experience and technologies. The Big 3 are 
now recording loss of more than 10,000 billion KRW in last two years. Most of the middle and small 
sized shipbuilding companies are in a life-and-death situation. Korea’s shipbuilding industry which 
used to rule over the global shipbuilding market is now facing the crisis to be a peripheral country, 
giving the lead to the neighboring countries like China and Japan (Note 12). 
To overcome the current state of crisis and regain the past world No. 1 position, Korea’s shipbuilding 
industry may need to carry out the following tasks. 
First, to continuously take the lead in the world market, Korea’s shipbuilding industry should make 
continuous efforts in the development of edge-cutting technologies. The past competitiveness of 
Korea’s shipbuilding industry originated from not a paradigm-changing innovative technology, like that 
of the British or Japanese technologies, but from the good human resources and technological power of 
the shipbuilding part based on the large sized docks possessed by chaebol companies. The shipbuilding 
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industry fostering policies by government also played an important role. However, since around the 
year 2000, as Korean shipbuilding companies started to have the ability to building various ships on the 
basis of the accumulated technological competence, they began to use the differentiating strategy 
focusing on superships, high value-added ships (LNG tankers, drilling ships, and ice breakers), and 
offshore plants. In 2004, Korea’s shipbuilding companies dominated the high value-added market, 
receiving 70% of the global orders for LNG tankers with reference to the number of ships. However, 
the rate of localized production of high value-added ships is about 60% or lower, in comparison with 
the localized production rate of 90% or higher in the case of general ships (Note 13). Particularly, the 
rate of localized production of the equipment and materials is about 20% to 30%, and the design is 
mostly dependent on the foreign technologies in the case of offshore plants, causing huge business loss 
in Korea’s Big 3. The design and technology in the field of offshore industry are exclusively possessed 
by the global companies of the Europe and the U.S, and thus penetrating the market is not easy 
currently.  
Therefore, Korean government published the Offshore Plant Industry Development Plan in November 
2013 to develop offshore plant technologies and to increase the rate of localized production of 
equipment and materials. The plan included concentrated investment of 900 billion KRW for fostering 
the industry, and establishment of offshore plant cluster in Busan, Ulsan and Gyeongnam, the 
southeastern region of Korea. However, the relevant investment is continuously decreased or withheld, 
as the offshore plant industry is considered as the cause of the business loss of Korea’s large 
shipbuilding companies. 
However, Korea’s shipbuilding companies still have comparative advantages in the building of offshore 
plants, which will give another opportunity to Korea’s shipbuilding companies with the recovery of 
global economy and the rise of oil price. Therefore, even though the current situation is not easy, the 
companies should continuously invest funds to research and development without letup. Such a 
difficult time may give an opportunity to secure offshore plant technologies, which will bring about 
more added-value in the future as the oil price rises and the demand for offshore plant facilities 
increases. 
In this regard, Korea’s Big 3 should do a self-examination and learn from the past mistakes made in the 
previous projects. 
As mentioned above, Korea’s shipbuilding industry has grown on the basis of large enterprises. The 
competitive system between large enterprises played an important role in elevating the global 
competitiveness of the entire shipbuilding industry of Korea. In addition, the competitiveness was 
further increased through mutual exchange of knowledge, technology, and know-how by sharing 
cooperative subsidiaries as well as human resources. However, the excessive competition between 
Korea’s Big 3 brought miserable result of the largest business loss ever, causing low-price orders 
received. At that time, Korea’ Big 3 were the only companies having the capability to build offshore 
plants, and oil managers had no other ways to order if the Big 3 had refused to receive. Nevertheless, 
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due to the excessive competition, the Big 3 caused delayed hand-over and deteriorated profitability by 
undertaking even insufficient design. Therefore, the companies should prevent such excessive 
competitions among companies, refuse impractical orders, and choose profitable ones, being focused 
on orders without design. The rate of localized production of offshore plant equipment and materials 
should be increased for timely procurement. Within the limit of not damaging the market economy, the 
Big 3 should collaborate in some areas for cooperation and standardization. The companies have 
already recognized the need for standardization. The ship classification societies of the U.S., Norway, 
and Germany, together with the major oil managers, are promoting standardization of the materials, 
design, and work procedures until early 2016. 
Second, for Korea’s shipbuilding companies to grow continuously, high-quality human resources 
needed in the shipbuilding industry should be positively fostered. Any industries need to foster and 
supply high level human resources in the relevant areas for continuous growth. In 1970’s and 1980’s 
when Korea’s shipbuilding industry speedily developed, a number of high-quality human resources 
gathered in the department of shipbuilding engineering in many universities, and the human resources 
developed and provided the fundamental technologies and applied technologies for the shipbuilding 
industry, helping Korea to be the top shipbuilding country of the world. However, due to the long-term 
depression of the shipbuilding industry, the preference of high-quality human resources to shipbuilding 
industry is gradually decreased to the point of losing mid-term and long-term competitiveness. 
Moreover, due to the Sewol Ferry Accident in 2014, the maritime industry started to have bad 
impression. Still being recognized as one of the 3D industries, outstanding students of science and 
engineering are heading to some of the edge-cutting technologies such as IT or BT with the decreasing 
preference to the fields relevant to shipbuilding industry. 
To solve the problems, the government decided to provide funds of 7.9 billion KRW for five years from 
2015 to 2019 in three areas of Ocean Energy Expert Human Resource Projects, including “human 
resource fostering project for offshore plant service industry”, “human resource fostering project for 
ocean energy research and development projects”, and “human resource fostering project for integrated 
ocean energy industry”. However, the plan partly modified due to the depression of the offshore plant 
industry. The human resources required by shipbuilding industry may not be secured by such a 
short-term support by the government focused on some specific aspects. Therefore, companies have to 
establish scholarship foundations and figure out ideas to invite high-quality human resources to foster 
human resources in shipbuilding industry. The academic section may contribute to foster researchers 
with the master’s or doctor’s degree by developing curriculums appropriate for the market demands and 
establishing relevant graduate school in the departments related to shipbuilding industry. 
Third, it is necessary to accurately predict the trend of world economy and environment, and to 
improve the ability to develop technologies accordingly.  
This issue is closely related with the firstly mentioned high technology development in the shipbuilding 
field. Recently, the global environmental regulations for pollution prevention have been intensified, and 
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the environment-friendly technologies became more important. Accordingly, issues are raised with 
regard to global clean energy, increased demand for new energy transport, “smart ships” combining 
shipbuilding and IT, and new concepts of high speed and ultra sized ships for energy saving. Other 
changes are made in luxurious leisure and sports boats due to the increase of income. 
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) already started to regulate double-hulled vessels or 
ballast water treatment. The IMO made the regulation that ships should be built to reduce greenhouse 
gas emission by 15% in 2015, 20% in 2020, and 30% in 2025 with reference to that of 2014. Therefore, 
in the worst case, a ship that does not satisfy the greenhouse gas emission standard may be refused to 
come into a harbor. 
Regulations on Energy Efficiency Design Index as well as SOx and NOx discharge are being 
intensified step by step. As the North Pole Route, which has been closed due to global warming, is 
newly open, new demand for the ships that could be used in the polar region is created. 
However, the ratio of research and development in the budget of Korea’s Big 3 is continuously 
decreasing year by year because of their financial situation, making the future of the shipbuilding 
industrial technology dark. 
The environment and the technology around shipbuilding industry will continuously change. Countries 
capable of accurately predicting the changes and providing needed technologies at the proper time will 
lead the global shipbuilding industry. Korea should recognize such changes around shipbuilding 
industry and search various methods of culturing the ability by promoting a special institute for the 
prediction and development of needed technologies in order to be able to beat Japan having 
technological power and low Yen effect as well as China making efforts for restructuring and bold 
innovation. 
In the global shipbuilding market, the competitive advantage has been moving to the regions with 
cheaper price. It moved the UK through Europe, Japan and to Korea. Currently, the status of world’s 
best Korea’s shipbuilding industry is being shaken from the bottom in the time of global economic 
recession.  
In 2015, the Big 3 shipbuilding companies, which tried to accomplish the goals of steady quantity of 
orders received, reached only the half of its goal. Such a trend became more severe in 2016; the 
shipbuilding orders received until June 2016 by the Big 3 shipyards of Korea were just 12, while 
Daewoo Shipbuilding received just two of the 12 orders, and Samsung Heavy Industries received none. 
Among the Big 3 shipyards in crisis with the “Order on the Cliff” state continues, Hyundai Heavy 
Industries and Samsung Heavy Industries submitted their own self-rescue plans to the major creditor 
bank and the plans were approved in early June to start restructuring. 
According to the self-rescue plans, Hyundai Heavy Industries will reduce the debt ratio from current 
134% to 100% until 2018 by preparing a total of 3,500 billion KRW, including 1,500 billion KRW 
through the selling of stocks and real estates, 800 billion KRW through business management 
rationalization such as manpower restructuring, and 1,200 billion KRW through business restructuring. 
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Samsung Heavy Industries also decided to prepare 1,500 billion KRW by selling non-business estates 
including Samsung Hotel Geoje and Pangyo R&D Center and decreasing production facilities. 
However, the self-rescue plan submitted by Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering Co., Ltd, 
which is in the deepest crisis, has not been approved yet. So, the survival of the company is still 
unclear. 
The future of Korea’s shipbuilding industry, which is currently in an unprecedented danger, will be 
determined depending on the problem solution of the Big 3 through their realization of the self-rescue 
plans as well as the direction of shipbuilding industry reconstructing policies decided by the Korean 
Government. 
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Notes 
Note 1. Korea Offshore & Shipbuilding Association was established in January 1948, Society of Naval 
Architects of Korea in November 1952, and Korean Register of Shipping in charge of promotion of 
ship safety as well as shipbuilding, maritime, and ocean technologies in 20 June 1960. 
Note 2. Since most of the parts including the engines, equipments, and machinery fittings were 
imported, the shipbuilding industry at that time had a low competitiveness due to the shipbuilding unit 
price in Korea higher than that of the international price. 
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Note 10. In end of 2016, Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering modified 440.9 billion KRW of 
gain for the year of 2013 to 778.4 billion KRW of loss, and 471.1 billion KRW of gain for the year of 
2014 to 742.9 billion KRW of loss. Accordingly, the business loss for the year of 2015 was revised to 
be 2,937.2 billion KRW. 
Note 11. According to the news from the industry, 5,000 billion KRW of loan has been given by the 
banks since 2010 to Sungdong Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering, 2,900 billion KRW to SPP 
Shipbuilding, 1,670 billion KRW to Daesun Shipbuilding & Engineering, and 3,500 billion KRW to 
STX Offshore & Shipbuilding since 2013. The total amount of the fund given to the four shipbuilding 
companies currently undergoing voluntary negotiation with the creditors is more than 10,000 billion 
KRW. “Rumors Coming Out About M&A of Middle and Small Sized Shipping Companies With No 
Funding”. Monthly Maritime Korea (Association of Korean Register, June 2015, pp. 66-70). 
Note 12. According to the statistical data collected by Korea’s Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy, 
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decreased to 8 in July 2015. Orient Shipyard and Sekwang Heavy Industries were closed, and Daehan 
Shipbuilding and Shina SB are under legal management. Among the remaining 8 companies, Hyundai 
Samho Heavy Industries and Hyundai Mipo Dockyard are the subsidiaries of Hyundai Heavy 
Industries. STX Offshore & Shipbuilding, Sungdong Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering, SPP 
Shipbuilding, and Daesun Shipbuilding & Engineering are under the creditors’ management (voluntary 
agreement). 
Note 13. Park, Jeong-Ho, Jae-Myung Kim, Yun-Kyun Oh, Dong-Sun Im & Ho-Sang Ham. (2010, 
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